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entire pharmaceutical industry.148 Although the FDA's primary
responsibility is the protection of the consumer,' the September
regulations questioned in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
would deprive not only the drug industry, but the public as well, of the
statutory right to comment and object to the substance of the
regulations. The FDA was required to remove ineffective drugs from
the market by the 1962 amendments; if notice and opportunity for
comment had been provided before the promulgation of the
September regulations, unnecessary litigation might have been
avoided and the designated drugs removed from the market much
sooner. When litigation occurs, testing by the NAS-NRC often
ceases, and the regulations are placed in abeyance pending the
outcome of litigation. Fair procedure in such cases can encourage
cooperation between the drug industry and the FDA, resulting in less
reluctance on the part of the drug manufacturers to comply with
subsequent drug regulations. Rule-making proceedings are not merely
confrontations between the FDA and the manufacturers but are
proceedings in which all interests should be considered, 5 such as the
interest of consumers in not paying substantially higher prices for
drugs to cover the companies' added expenses for what may be
unnecessary testing. Sections 4(b) and 4(c) of the APA were enacted
to ensure public participation in the rule-making process, for broader
participation enables agencies to educate themselves before
establishing procedures and rules which will have a substantial impact
on the public and on the industries regulated.' A denial of notice and
the opportunity to comment may facilitate the enforcement of agency
policy in the short-run, but it is the rule of law and the public interest
which eventually will suffer when procedural safegurards are
circumscribed.
IV. ADJUDICATION
The Evolving Right To Counsel In Social Security Hearings
In the past year a small, but perhaps important, change has
148. The obvious effect of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association can be observed in
the republishing of the September regulations in February, 1970, in full compliance with the
APA.
149. See United States v. Two Bags, 147 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1945), which gives as the
purpose of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act the protection of the ultimate consumer.
150. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(3) (1964).
151. SeeTexaco, lnc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
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developed in the judicial attitude toward the right to counsel in Social
Security benefit hearings. The recently decided cases' in most of the
courts of appeal have continued to hold that lack of counsel at the
examiner's hearing cannot be "good cause" for remand to the
Secretary of HEW under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act.2
However, the Sixth Circuit seems to be taking a somewhat different
Attitude. In the cas& of Webb v. Finch3 the court remanded to the
Secretary an appeal from a denial of benefits solely because of an
allegation that additional evidence could have been adduced at an
examiner's hearing but for the absence of counsel.
It is generally conceded that there is currently no constitutional or
statutory right to assigned counsel in Social Security hearings., An
argument that the fifth amendment's due process clause mandates
assigned counsel encounters several hurdles, one of which is concerned
with whether Social Security benefits are a right or a privilege.
Although the theory that anyone has a vested right to receive Social
Security benefits has been explicitly repudiated,- the distinction has
been rendered less important by the stance recently taken by the
Supreme Court. In Goldberg v. Kelly' the Court held that the due
process clause mandated certain procedural safeguards before welfare
benefits could be terminated regardless of whether the receipt of
payments was considered a right or a privilege. The Court in
Goldberg viewed the welfare benefits at issue7 as "a matter of
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them"8 implying
that payments due under a welfare scheme, such as Social Security,
are"more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' "I While Goldberg eroded
the right-privilege distinction in the welfare area, the Court explicitly
1. E.g., Granger v. Finch, 425 F.2d 206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Granger v.
Richardson, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Cross v. Finch, 427 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1970); Easley v. Finch,
431 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1970); Domozik v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1969).
2. "The court. . . may, at any time, on good cause shown, order additional evidence to be
taken before the Secretary. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1964).
3. 431 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1970).
4. See, e.g., Vega v. Secretary, IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 16,042 (D.P.R. 1970);
McGaughy v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. La. 1967).
5. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
6. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
7. Aid to Families with Dependent Children as established by the Social Security Act of
1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1964), and administered by the state of New York. See N.Y. Soc.
WELFARE LAW §§ 343-62 (1966).
8. 397 U.S. at 262.
9. Id. at n.8. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issue,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
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limited its holding to the issue of whether due process required an
informal hearing prior to a welfare benefit termination'0 and refused
to require that counsel be provided at these hearings." However, the
opinion contains dicta which might well serve as an impetus for the
argument that due process requirements demand counsel in the Social
Security area. In discussing the character of welfare hearings the
Court stated that "[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to
the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."' 2 In
referring to the right of the claimant to retain counsel, the Court
acknowledged: "Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the
factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination,
and generally safeguard the interests of the recipient."' 3 Obviously,
those applicants without the funds, intelligence, or strength of
personality to present their cases effectively are going to be
substantially prejudiced, especially when one considers that most of
the claims are prosecuted by persons claiming disabilities or by
elderly persons substantially unable to bear the burden of collecting
and presenting evidence. However, no lower federal courts have
undertaken to provide counsel for Social Security litigants, either
before the agency or on appeal," in the absence of express direction by
the Supreme Court.'5
Social Security appeals are reviewed pursuant to section 205 of the
Social Security Act 6 under a relatively simple procedure. When an
application for benefits is denied and reconsideration also results in
denial, the applicant may demand a hearing before an examiner, 7
who then makes a decision which may be reviewed by an Appeals
Council' which makes a final decision on behalf of the Secretary of
10. 397 U.S. at 267.
11. Id. at 270.
12. Id. at 268-69.
13. Id. at 270-71.
14. See McGaughy v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. La. 1967) (demand for assigned
counsel refused).
15. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a case where the lack of counsel was asserted
as error. Granger v. Finch, 425 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Paul v. Celebrezze, 337 F.2d
352 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 906 (1965).
16. The applicability of the APA to Social Security hearings has been the subject of
considerable litigation. However, the APA provides no greater right to counsel than does the
Social Security Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. V, 1970). See Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44,
rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. granted sub nom. Richardson v. Perales,
400 U.S. 811 (1970); Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DuKE
L.J. 67, 146-56.
17. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917,404.919-20 (1970).
18. Id. § 404.945.
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H EW. After exhausting this process, a claimant may appeal to a
United States district court. 9 The court is given power under the
statute to remand a case to the Secretary where "good cause" is
shown for the receipt of additional evidence. 2 Many litigants have
attempted to assert that lack of counsel before the hearing examiner is
sufficient cause for remand. Generally, they have been unsuccessful,
especially where no special prejudice can be demonstrated; 21 however,
the list of cases where lack of counsel at the administrative level has
been cause for remand is growing. 22
While the movement is perhaps strongest at the district court level,
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Webb v. Finch2 is demonstrative of a
court's reluctance to affirm a denial of benefits where the applicant
has been unable to present his case effectively below. Although the
court acknowledged that there were ample grounds to affirm a
judgment denying benefits, it noted that the applicant had a limited
education and only the help of a non-lawyer friend in presenting his
case. In argument, Webb's attorney alleged that additional evidence
of disability existed that had not been presented at the hearing.
Relying on this possibility of additional evidence and the lack of
counsel at the hearing, the court of appeals remanded the case to the
Secretary. Given heavy weight in the decision was the fact that the
applicant represented himself "with obvious ineffectiveness [and was]
...hampered by lack of education. ' 24
The dissent in Webb essentially restated the law as it is generally
conceived in the other courts of appeal. It distinguished the earlier
Sixth Circuit case of Arms v. Gardner,?- wherein a Social Security
applicant who was actually represented by an attorney was given a
remand because
19. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1964).
20. Id. See note 2 supra.
21. E.g., Cross v. Finch, 427 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1970); Granger v. Finch, 425 F.2d 206 (7th
Cir. 1970); Steimer v. Gardner, 395 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1968); Ussi v. Folsom, 254 F.2d 842 (2d
Cir. !958); Kennedy v. Finch, F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1970); Vega v. Secretary, IA CCH
UNEMPL. INS. REP. 16,042 (D.P.R. 1970); Pimental v. Secretary, 297 F. Supp. 212 (D.
Mass. 1969); McGaughy v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. La. 1967); Meola v. Ribicoff, 207
F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (remanded on other grounds); Butler v. Folsom, 167 F. Supp.
684 (W.D. Ark, 1958); Wray v. Folsom, 166 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (remanded on
other grounds).
22. E.g., Webb v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1970); Arms v. Gardner, 353 F.2d 197 (6th
Cir. 1965); Crowder v. Gardner, 249 F. Supp. 678 (D.S.C. 1966); Ilhnen v. Celebrezze, 223 F.
Supp. 157 (D.S.D. 1963); Hall v. Celebrezze, 217 F. Supp. 905 (M.D.N.C. 1963).
23. 431 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 1180.
25. 353 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1965).
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the attorney took no part in the examination of witnesses, offered no testimony
in appellee's behalf and gave the appellee no apparent legal assistance in the
preparation of his case, admitting on the record that he knew very little about
Social Security laws.26
The dissent relied on the fact that Webb's lay advisor was experienced
in giving advice to Social Security claimants. The citation of. a
number of cases, however, reveals that the dissent simply denied that
there is any particular right to have one's case skillfully presented. z2
Judge McCree concluded that "1l]ack of counsel at a hearing is not
sufficient grounds for remand in the absence of a showing of clear
prejudice or unfairness."
An examination of the particular situations of the claimants in
Webb and Arms as compared to those in cases where remands have
been denied 2 reveals that the unsuccessful claimants are usually
illiterate, or nearly so, and presumably have little capacity to
understand the nature of legal procedures. While the courts which
have denied remand purport to leave open the case where a claimant is
clearly prejudiced by lack of counsel, one suspects that it will be
difficult to demonstrate such prejudice to these courts. The Sixth
Circuit decision in Arms should be compared with the Ninth Circuit
decision in Steimer v. Gardner3 In Arms the court concluded:
A careful review of the record however discloses that the claimant did not have
the proper representation to which he was entitled at the hearing before the
examiner. As stated above, his attorney failed and was admittedly unable to
give him the legal assistance he should have had to present his evidence and to
cross-examine the witnesses produced.3'
In Steimer the applicant argued that not only was she unable to
effectively present her case but that she was misled by the Social
Security literature into believing that she did not need counsel. The
court decided that the notice of hearing form was not misleading and
that it contained all the information necessary to establish the
disability claim.3 2
In an effort to lessen the impact of the lack of counsel on the
unsophisticated claimant for Social Security, some courts have
26. Id. at 199.
27. 431 F.2d at 1180.
28. Id.
29. See Cross v. Finch, 427 F.2d 4.06 (5th Ciri. 1970); Vega v. Secretary, IA CCH UN-
EMPL. INS. RE'. 16,042 (D.P.R. 1970).
30. 395 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1968).
31. 353 F.2d at 199 (emphasis added).
32. 395 F.2d at 198-99.
Vol. 1971:149]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
developed a doctrine that the examiner must step in and assist the
unrepresented claimant in the presentation of his case, at least to the
extent of making sure that all available witnesses are called and that
the claimant understands the nature of the proof required.3 This duty
may, however, interfere with the performance of the examiner's main
function-impartial resolution of the disputeY However, the Social
Security regulations do state that the hearing examiner "shall inquire
fully" into the issues raised in the hearing.3 Perhaps if this duty of full
inquiry were effectively rendered the meritorious applicant would have
little difficulty in establishing eligibility for benefits. At present,
however, the Social Security applicant must depend on the good will
of employees willing to give advice and on the written explanatory
materials available for his case.
In considering allegations that lack of counsel at a prior hearing
prejudiced a claimant's case, some courts have distinguished the
applicant who files a second benefit application after his earlier claim
has been decided adversely and the claimant who appeals from an
original denial of benefits. In the former instance courts have
universally applied the doctrine of res judicata and denied the second
application in- accordance with the finality provisions of the Social
Security regulations .3  Some claimants have attempted to persuade
the courts to disregard the original application on the ground that,
absent counsel, their case was ineffectively presented at the
administrative hearing or was not properly appealed. In Easley v.
Finch3 17 the Fourth Circuit rejected such a claim. In Easley the
claimant had filed four applications for benefits3-three without the
33. See Stewat v. Cohen, 309 F. Supp. 949 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.922 (1970).
35. Id. § 404.927.
36. Id. § 404.937(b). See, e.g., Domozik v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1969); Rushing v.
Finch, 310 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. La. 1970).
37. 431 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1970).
38. An application was first filed in October 1960 claiming disability as of December 1959
due to asthma. Easely did not ask for reconsideration, the first step in Social Security review,
and the origin'al denial became final. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.909-17 (1970). The second
application reasserted the asthma claim and also alleged disability due to arm weakness. This
time Easley sought reconsideration after denial but was again rebuffed. At the hearing the
examiner concluded that Easley was not entitled to benefits. The third application was also
denied at the reconsideration stage. The request for hearing was denied because no new evidence
was offered and the Appeals Council, the final administrative review body, denied relief. See
generally I CCH UNEMPL. INS. REp. 12,655-91 (1970) (general explanation of Social Security
appeal procedure); Note, Administrative Procedure and the Social Security Disability Program,
2 IND. LEGAL F. 295 (1969).
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assistance of counsel. On Easley's fourth attempt he was represented
by counsel who took the case through the entire administrative
process, trying unsuccessfully to convince the agency to reopen the
case. Easley finally took his case to court where the district court
judge held that administrative res judicata did not apply since Easley
had been without counsel at the first hearing and because he never had
judicial review of his claim.39 The district court went on to find Easley
disabled, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that lack of counsel
was "insufficient basis for disregarding the principle of repose."40
The Fourth Circuit's reversal in Easley is probably correct on the
alternate ground -that the claimant was not in fact disabled.
41
However, the contention that Easley's claim was barred by res
judicata is unwarranted, primarily because there is no justification for
limiting the statutory standard of "good cause" to the restricted
meaning implied by the regulations. Social Security regulations
provide for the dismissal of a claim on the ground of res judicata if a
previous application containing the same material has been
determined adversely to the claimant, 42 but the Secretary is
empowered to reopen an application up to four years from its denial
when "good cause ' 43 is shown. Good cause is defined in the
regulations as existing when "new and material evidence is
furnished,' 4  a clerical error is found, 45 or an error appears on the face
of the record.46 Good cause as used in the regulations would thus not
seem to include an allegation that lack of counsel had made an
effective presentation of the claimant's case impossible, but rather the
situation where new evidence is discovered after the record is closed.
By contrast, section 205(g) of the Social Security Act 47 authorizes a
remand to the Secretary for the taking of additional evidence for good
cause. Seemingly there is no reason why any less good cause would
have existed to deny Easley a remand of his application than existed in
Webb, 41 where the court found that good cause to remand under the
39. The district court's opinion is unreported.
40. 431 F.2d at 1353.
41. Id. at 1354.
42. 20 C.F.R. § 404.937(a) (1970).
43. Id. § 404.957(b).
44. Id. § 404.958(a). This provision seems oriented to evidence produced by the
government.
45. Id. § 404.958(b).
46. Id. § 404.958(c). See Grose v. Cohen, 406 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1969).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1964).
48. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
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statute could include a lack of counsel which contributed to an
ineffective presentation of the case. However, the Easley court viewed
the use of the doctrine of res judicata from the regulations as serving
the broader purpose of confining review of Social Security claims
strictly to the scheme set forth in the Act and implemented by the
regulations. Still, protection of the applicant's right to an effective
presentation of his case is a value which also deserves consideration.
The Easley decision seems to be rooted in the philosophical view that
Social Security Administration proceedings are fundamentally fair,
even without counsel at the administrative stages. 9 Yet the district
court's view may be more in accord with the scope of section 205(g),10
which apparently makes remand largely a discretionary tool, free
from the rigid procedural restraints that Easley imposes.
It would be unwise to contend that all Social Security applicants
should have counsel appointed for them at an early stage, due to the
tremendous volume of the applications that are processed each year."
Many applicants need do no more than fill out a simple form in order
to obtain benefits, and the Social Security Administration has been
lenient in allowing benefits.5 2 In fact, some 83 percent of all claims are
allowed initially or on reconsideration.0 Even in the disability area,
into which most of the contested applications fall, more than half of
the claims are successful in the pre-hearing stages. 5 Yet the applicant
who comes to a hearing without counsel faces serious difficulties. The
burden of establishing the claim falls upon him,5 although he may be
unable to understand the nature of the proof required. The more
49. A bearing on an application for benefits is not an adversary proceeding. The
applicant is confronted with no adversary in the usual sense of that term. The Social
Security Administration provides an applicant with assistance to prove his claim. Here,
the Administration provided a comprehensive medical examination. There is no reason to
suspect any influence which would compromise its objectivity. Although only about five
percent of all applicants are represented by counsel at the initial and reconsideration
stages, the majority of claims are allowed. This hardly suggests the existence of
widespread unfairness to applicants unrepresented by counsel ....
431 F.2d at 1353 (citations omitted).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1964).
51. In fiscal 1968 disability claims numbered 515,938. The total number of all claims was
almost four million. 431 F.2d at 1353 n.9.
52. But see L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 407-
09 (3d ed. 1968).
53. 431 F.2d at 1353 n.9.
54. Disability claims granted in the two pre-hearing stages numbered 343,628 (67 percent of
those filed) in fiscal 1968. Id.
55. See, e.g., Franklin v. Secretary, 393 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1968).
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meritorious his disability claim, the less likely he will be able to do
those things necessary to prosecute his case effectively. His inability to
work will often prevent him from hiring counsel, and that same
difficulty will make his search for witnesses and other evidence a very
difficult task. However, the courts may be able to avoid a rigorous
rule requiring counsel if they are careful, as was the Sixth Circuit in
Webb, not to deny routinely a request for a remand for the taking of
additional evidence. A claimant, finally desperate enough to secure
representation, should not be denied a proper hearing where he was
initially beset by age, disability, lack of education, or lack of
intelligence. Additionally, the examiner's duty of fair inquiry into the
issues before him might be broadly construed to demand that the
relative complexity of the issues before him be examined with a view
toward discerning whether counsel is necessary in a given case. At
least the claimant could then be encouraged to seek help from the
private bar or an appropriate legal aid agency if the examiner so
recommended.
Right to Hearing in License Renewal Proceeding when Allegation
is the Subject of Concurrent Rule-making Proceeding
In Hale v. FCC"6 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that section 309(e) of the Communications
Act5 7 does not require the FCC to grant a hearing in a license renewal
proceeding to petitioners whose allegations of the licensee's violations
of the "fairness doctrine" and of excess concentration of media
ownership were not supported by the required specific factual
instances of harm to the public. Private citizens challenging the
proposed renewal of the license of KSL-AM radio station, held by the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormon Church)
through KSL, Inc., alleged that the licensee had violated the FCC's
"fairness doctrine" and that the church's extensive holdings of other
communications media in the area gave it a concentration of power
56. 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). Section 309(e) reads in relevant part:
If, in the case of any application to which subsection (a) of this section applies [to
authorize renewal of licenses], a substantial and material question of fact is presented or
the Commission for any reason is unable to make the finding [that the public interest
would be served], it shall formally designate the application for hearing. . ..
58. FCC, Application of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Information, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).
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